The Kosovo Case as a Matryoshka Doll: Why did Russia withdrew its troops from Kosovo?
Published in South Slav Journal,Vol. 31, No. 3–4, Pg. 18-32.
Abstract: The aim of this article is to explain the reasons for Russian troops withdrawal from Kosovo in 2003. The analysis starts with the incident at Slatina airport at the end of NATO airstrikes of Yugoslavia in June 1999, and its consequences on Russia – NATO relations. The article also points out the changes that occurred in Russian foreign and security policy (including the war in Chechnya 1999) that were conditioned and impacted by the Kosovo 1999 crisis. Colossal political changes that occurred on the global scale in terms of 9/11 effects on Russian-USA relations, decisive influence of NATO in the region of SEE, democratic changes in Serbia in 2000 and overall “cooling” of relations between Moscow and Belgrade were all taken into account as the reasons for Russian military withdrawal from the Balkans and the KFOR mission in Kosovo.
Key words: Russia, Russian troops, Kosovo, FR Yugoslavia, NATO.
General Background of Kosovo and Metohia International Problem
The NATO military action against the FRY ended on 9 June 1999, after 78 days of airstrikes. The legal foundation for ending the airstrikes and conflicts in Kosovo was established in UN SC Resolution 1244 adopted the same day in the UN SC. The Resolution was based on the principles and aims of the UN, earlier adopted principles of G8 MFA in Sankt Petersburg (6 May 1999), the Agreement on Political Principles between the FRY and the EU and Russian envoys, Martti Ahtisaari and Victor Chernomyrdin, and Military-Technical agreement from Kumanovo between International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (9 June 1999). All these documents legalized the already planned withdrawal from Kosovo of all Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces and deployment of international military and civil presence in Kosovo.
The Resolution authorized the UN Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, “to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo”. Therefore, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo – UNMIK was established under security support of NATO-lead KFOR (Kosovo Force). After Slatina incident, Russian troops wanted to have their own zone, but they were soon deployed in different zones under the unique command of KFOR. Russian troops withdrew from Kosovo during the summer of 2003.
Even though Milošević proclaimed victory over NATO, it was clear that the agreements he accepted basically meant surrender. Not only that he had to withdraw all the forces from the territory of KiM, but, according to the Military Technical Agreement, also on the territory outside KiM, Yugoslavia was not in full control of its territory. Namely, Yugoslav forces had to withdraw beyond The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ), which is 5 km beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory, and only local police forces were allowed to stay within this zone, while KFOR was given the airspace control over the whole Kosovo and the Air Safety Zone (ASZ), defined as a 25-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. Provisions that would remain as a kind of “positive” legacy for the governments succeeding Milošević, were the ones from UN SC Resolution 1244 that were ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY along with a possibility of some military and police to return, in order to help international mission, help demining, maintain presence at Serb patrimonial site and protect borders.
Through acts, statements and visits of former Russian representative in UN, Sergey Lavrov, to Belgrade and Priština in November 1999, Russia demonstrated its position about Kosovo and support for Belgrade in this issue. Russia supported implementation of the UN SC Resolution 1244, therefore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, and Serbian attempts to stop transformation of KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) into Kosovo Protection Force. Also, Russia backed Serbian initiative for the return of some Serbian police and Yugoslav servicemen to Kosovo and the extension of UN guarantees for the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of permanent residence in Kosovo. Coordination between Yugoslav authorities and Lavrov was obvious, since in his statements Lavrov was repeating what was written in the Memorandum that Yugoslavia submitted to the UN SC and the UN Secretary – General just before Lavrov made his Yugoslav tour.
Changes in Russia after Kosovo War – “Today Yugoslavia Tomorrow Russia”
“Mike, these aren’t Washington’s orders, they’re coming from me.”
“By whose authority?”
“By my authority, as Saceur.”
“You don’t have that authority.”
“I do have that authority. I have the authority of the Secretary-General behind me on this.”
“Sir, I’m not going to start World War Three for you.”
This conversation took place on 12 June 1999, between Saceur of NATO (The Supreme Allied Commander Europe – Saceur), General Wesley Clark, and General Sir Michael Jackson, commander of NATO’s Rapid Reaction Corps, whose task was to secure the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces after NATO airstrikes stopped and Milošević agreed to accept the defeat. The order was to block the runways at Priština airfield that was surprisingly taken by Russian troops that came from the Russian peacekeeping forces contingent in Bosnia. This meant possible use of force and armed conflict between NATO and Russia. Since Russia failed to send reinforcement because of rejection of Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to allow them to fly through their airspace, the Russian strategic move soon turned to be a complete failure – their small contingent was soon dispersed in other zones controlled by NATO led KFOR. In this way Russia failed to realize its two main tasks during the negotiations with NATO – its own separate sector and not to be under the NATO chain of command.
This taking over of the Slatina airport was “seemingly designed to strengthen the Russian position in negotiations, and according to US military sources, as the beginning of a unilateral attempt to set up a Russian sector”. For Clark, Russian sector was unacceptable because that would lead to a “separate mission favouring the Serbs, meaning in effect a de facto partition of the province”. In the end, Russian troops were scattered all over Kosovo in sectors of NATO states, except in the northern part, which was majorly populated by Serbs, and which the Russians intentionally insisted on during the negotiations. Still, Yeltsin later wrote that takeover of Slatina was a “sign of our moral victory in the face of the enormous NATO military, all of Europe and the whole world”. However, these events showed Russia’s vulnerability, while NATO demonstrated how little respect and fear they had for Russia and its military, though this was showed even during the NATO airstrikes. This can be seen from certain facts such as the threat of that time US Secretary of State, William Cohen, that he would attack Russian oil tankers if they tried to violate NATO embargo against Yugoslavia. On the other hand, Russia also showed weakness in attempts to get the support from the CIS states. Only Russia, Belarus and Tajikistan openly opposed NATO intervention while the so called GUUAM states (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) either approved or didn’t openly oppose it.
There are many opinions about influences of this war on Russian relations with the NATO and the West. For Alexander Lukin from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), the 1999 conflict was also interpreted as NATO readiness “to launch a direct assault against Russia’s interest and sovereignty”. Others, like Dov Lynch assumed that Putin drew conclusion that this meant near end of importance of international law and the UN Charter in international affairs and of the primacy of state sovereignty. This crisis also marked the return of realpolitik in the relations between Russia and NATO and “brought an end to myths and a return to reality between Russia and NATO, both for the Russian political elite and for the public at large”. Besides, Russia feared that this intervention could become a precedent and a model for similar interventions in Central Asia, Caucasus and even in Chechnya.
Although this left traces on Russian relations with the Western countries and NATO, Russia also managed to exploit this situation to its advantage. The second war in Chechnya was launched during Putin’s first mandate as Prime Minister of the RF, as a response to invasion of Dagestan by armed Chechen groups in August 1999. Russia’s military campaign in war was modeled after NATO Kosovo campaign – heavy reliance on airpower, targeting civilian targets (bridges, oil refineries) Jamie Shea style press briefings, and accusations against Chechens for committing ethnic cleansing of Russians. Predrag Simić, from the University of Belgrade argued that Chechen war restored confidence in the Russian army. Besides, according to Simić, another result achieved by Russia through Kosovo crisis, was that it managed to avoid entering into an open conflict which could have happened if Yugoslavia had joined the Union of Russia and Belarus. Further, he added that Russia managed to impose itself as a mediator in this process and therefore to have its significance recognized as an unavoidable factor of the international relations in Europe and further. Regarding war in Chechnya, Simić confirmed Oksana Antonenko’s claims and added that “after Kosovo, there is little the West could do to prevent Russian offensive in Chechnya“. The last positive result for Russia, he said, was initiation of change in the Russian military doctrine. This document was released on 9 October 1999, and was different from the previous national security concept in matters where, instead of putting internal factors as an extensive threat to stability like earlier, new doctrine defined external factors as great threat to Russian stability. Among others, attempts to prevent the RF from having influence on the international scene, deliberate weakening of the UN and OSCE, military campaign without a UN mandate, and violation of international law were designated as threats . For Dov Lunch, success in Chechen war was a sure ticket for Putin’s winning on the upcoming elections and a place where, for Putin, the rebirth of Russia would begin. Alexei Arbatov from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, added that “Kosovo removed taboo against using force in Chechnya“ and “because NATO proclaimed its right to attack a sovereign state to achieve NATO’s own aims, Russia was all the more entitled to use force on its own territory“. In the end, it should be added that Russia used Kosovo crisis to strengthen its military ties with Belarus and other CIS allies.
Although the Kosovo crisis created political earthquake between Russia on one side and the USA and NATO on the other, things soon normalized between them. In the same month when bombing ended, Russia was recognized as a full member of the G8 while Russian and USA presidents, Yeltsin and Clinton met and discussed the economic cooperation and arms limitation treaties. This normalization was also announced by Putin, while still Prime Minister – “Russia should be and will be integral part of civilized world, and in this context we will cooperate with NATO”. Other signals were readiness of Russia to participate in NATO led KFOR chain command and the fact that the new/old appointed Russia’s representative at the NATO became General Victor Zavarzin, the same general that led expedition of Russian troops from Bosnia to Slatina Airport in June 1999.
Withdrawal of Russian Troops in 2003
Four years after the spectacular entrance in Priština airport, in the middle of the first half of 2003, Russia, after consultations with NATO, withdrew its troops from only places they were military present in the Balkans – Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. According to the sources of one high rank diplomat of Serbia, the information that Russia would retreat was announced to the political top of Serbia by Prime Minister of Russia, Mikhail Kasyanov, at the Earth Summit (September 2002) held in Johannesburg. According to this source, Kasyanov told Koštunica and Svilanović, who were also attending the Summit, that Russia had two reasons for withdrawal. He said the first reason was that Russia had no interest in Kosovo, neither economic nor political, and the second was that Russia didn’t want to be an accomplice in what was going on in Kosovo, or in a way this source interpreted – they were on the ground, but had no influence.
One year after the withdrawal, Putin publicly justified this decision by saying that Russia no longer wanted to “dissemble” the development of Kosovo issue in wrong direction. Different words were used by Putin when he addressed the Military Contingent of International Peacekeeping Force in Kosovo, Priština, on 17 June 2001. In that speech he dramatically presented the situation of the whole region of South Eastern Europe which for Russia, in his words, had “strategic importance” determined by “geopolitical factors” and “historical traditions and the cultural and religious closeness” and he expressed the need to “step up” military presence in the region” which would help to “strengthen the authority of Russia both in the Balkans, and in the international arena as a whole”. 
The former ambassador of the Russian Federation in Serbia and Montenegro, Vladimir Ivanovski, regarding the withdrawal, stated that Russians were not leaving the region but “changing their forms of presence in the region”, and that they would continue their “political and economic presence in the region”, of course, with continuation of cooperation with NATO partners. That time MFA of the RF, Ivanov, defined these other forms of Russia’s presence in the region as participation of Russia through frameworks of “UN, OSCE, other international organizations and bilaterally”.
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the RF, General Anatoly Kvashnin, justified the withdrawal with the lack of financial means for the maintenance of Russian troops. This 25 million dollars expenditure for Russia was nothing comparing to 60 billion Russian rubbles (around $ 2 billion) that Russia spent for reconstructing the city of Sankt Petersburg for the 300 years anniversary (2003) of this former tsarist Russia capital, or as it is commonly called “Russian window to Europe”. Indeed, one of the reasons could be the fact that Russia was looking at Europe, mostly toward its strategic partners, the EU countries with whom in 2003 it agreed upon creating four common spaces, and particularly with the most important EU member states – Germany, France and Italy with whose leaders Putin was building personal relations. Other reasons can be found in the fact that Central Asia was becoming very significant for both Russia and the USA. After previously mentioned Putin’s speech in Priština, something huge occurred in international relations and that was 9/11 and American global war against terrorism. For Russia and Putin this was justification of threat of terrorism against which they were fighting inside their own boundaries. Consequently, Putin urged in helping the USA and UK in war in Afghanistan. In July 2002, Putin described partnership with the USA as an unconditional priority of foreign policy along with countering terrorism.
During the process of withdrawing from Kosovo, Russia was facing much bigger and more serious tasks and problems, both at home and on international arena. In the country, it was still in the process of stabilizing Chechnya, centralizing power and searching for the ways of conducting successful long-term economic growth. On the international scale the relations with the USA were very important for Putin. The USA retreated from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (December 2001), while military activities on Russian southern borders were increasing, and therefore, logically, the stability of that region became the focus of its attention. The USA troops were in Afghanistan to stay, and the USA had its own military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (they were the first USA bases on the territory of CIS) and established military presence in Georgia as well. War in Iraq, which Russia opposed, was underway. For both the USA and Russia the region of Central Asia became very important because of its great energy resources and geostrategic importance. It is the point from which one controls main energy resources, oil and gas, and future crisis points of vital importance for maintaining the global order. It was of great importance for Putin to counter American presence in the region by reasserting Moscow authority, but without directly challenging the USA. Other international problems in which Russia got involved were the concern over North Korea decisions to openly acknowledge its Nuclear program (31 December 2002), and Russia’s attempts to play the role of mediator in this problem.
Further reasons could also be found on the ground of Kosovo itself. Russia not only failed to have its own sector and to avoid being in NATO chain command, but it wasn’t supported by the other KFOR members neither were its troops desirable by great majority of Kosovo inhabitants – Kosovo Albanians. This was seen during the blockade of Orahovac, when local Albanians blocked the entrance to Orahovac, town where Serbs used to be in a great number, and whose control Russians were supposed to take over. On the other hand, Airport in Priština where Russians remained present lost its strategic importance after the USA built Bondsteel, its own military base in Kosovo. Moreover, when a crisis broke in Southern Serbia in spring of 2001, with a support of radical elements from Kosovo and Metohia, new authorities from Serbia, unlike Milošević, turned for help to NATO, EU and OSCE. It was clear who was in charge on the ground. Putin openly spoke in 2004 about lack of influence of Russian troops on Kosovo as reasons for withdrawal – “We withdrew our military contingent from there not because we are indifferent to all that is taking place in Kosovo. Not because of this. We did this because the presence of our military contingent, which does not decide anything and cannot influence anything, was pointless.”
The fact that Russia was facing more serious problems on its own borders, made the region of SEE less important for Russia. Besides, countries from the region also lost interest for Russia – they were either on a way of joining or were already in NATO. The last president of Yugoslavia noted that Serbian authorities of that time were mostly orientated toward the USA and that Russian influence gradually wakened after the removal of Milošević, while journalist of influencing Serbian weekly NIN, Branko Stošić described relations between Moscow and Belgrade in 2003 as “never more miserable in whole history” and that “they are no longer interesting to one another” . Physical separation from Kosovo was additional cause, “Russia was separated from the region with chain of NATO member states and it has lost political partners in the region… therefore importance of Moscow in this region has drastically decreased in last decade.” As John Berryman noted: “In 2003, as the US invaded Iraq, Russia evacuated its forces from Bosnia and Kosovo, thus effectively ceding the western Balkans to the western sphere of influence.” 
We also have to keep in mind that on a political scene of Serbia, Russia’s one of the most important remained partner in the Balkan, its most significant protégé that was in power, Vojislav Koštunica, has lost his political role and influence in Yugoslavia. It is certain that in the political clash between Koštunica and Đinđić, the former has lost. As James Headley notes – “Russia also appeared to align itself with Koštunica in his disputes with Djindjic, once the latter became Prime Minister of Serbia: Koštunica was more nationalistic and less Western – oriented, and might be more useful to Russia than Djindjic”. But, despite this, Koštunica failed to prevent the, strongly objected by Russia, extradition of Milošević to the ICTY, and he also lost his function as a president during the “reconstruction” of Yugoslavia when the so called “Belgrade agreement” was signed between Yugoslav republics therefore establishing the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In the end, his party lost influence after its members lost their seats in the parliament in June 2002.
Though Russia has withdrawn from Kosovo, its policy toward this issue didn’t change in essence. During his visit to Belgrade, in September 2003, Russian MFA, Igor Ivanov, spoke with the new Prime Minister, Zoran Živković, and MFA of SMN, Goran Svilanović, as well. They agreed that dialogue between Priština and Belgrade was necessary and that UN SCR 1244 must be fully respected. Relations with Russia of that period could be analysed through words of MFA of Serbia and Montenegro, Svilanović, spoken publicly after the talks with Ivanov – He stated that Belgrade wanted to have permanently stable relations with Russia based on reality and pragmatism with acknowledging of equality and differences between the two states. 
It is interesting to mention that Ivanov also visited Koštunica who stayed out from any state political function. The main topic of their conversations was the issue of Kosovo. Since Koštunica was only the president of his party (which was no longer in power), Ivanov’s visit could mean that Russia didn’t turn its back to Koštunica, and that Russia was expecting what would soon happen – Koštunica would rise to power once more and the policy toward Russia would change. After all, in the already mentioned interview given to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Koštunica stated that current government was making a mistake in foreign policy for relying only on the USA and neglecting Russia. He proposed that some kind of balance between these influences must be established, and therefore implied the potential for the return of Russian influence in Serbia, thus assuring that his opinion was heard in Kremlin.
 “Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari meet with Milošević in Belgrade”, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 5, Issue. 107, 03-06-1999. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=12395&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=213, 21-02-2011.
 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999.
UN Security Council, 1244 Resolution, point 10, S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. pp. 3.
Rodgers, Walter. “Milosevic proclaims victory with end to Kosovo conflict”, CNN.com, 10-06-1999, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9906/10/kosovo.milosevic/index.html, 12-10-2010.
Military Technically Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and
the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999.
Russian Envoy Chernomyrdin described this as a success – “…but the main thing is that Yugoslavia’s sovereignty is intact and a legal foundation has been laid putting the resolution of the Kosovo under the aegis of the UN.” In – Headley, James. “Russia and the Balkans: foreign policy from Yeltsin to Putin”. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2008, pp. 400.
This was negotiated between EU envoy Ahtisaari, US envoy Talbott, and Russian envoy Chernomyrdin during their meeting in former Jospeh Stalin dacha at Kintsevo the end of May 1999. Look in: Headley, James. 2008, pp. 396.
UN Security Council, 1244 Resolution, Appendix II, Point 6, S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. pp. 6.
 “Top Russian diplomat visits Kosovo”. Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 5 Issue. 209, 11-11-1999, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Ball_the_words%5D=Kosovo%20Chechnya&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=6&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=11672&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=2082eeadc796952af8a6cb0c962318a1, 21-12-2010.
Slogan used in Russia during NATO campaign against Yugoslavia.
 Jackson, Mike General Sir. “Gen Sir Mike Jackson: My clash with Nato chief”. The Telegraph
04-09-2007. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1562161/Gen-Sir-Mike-Jackson-My-clash-with-Nato-chief.html, 09-09-2010.
 About Russian demands in negotiations read in Woodward, Will and Northon-Taylor, Richard. “The plan for a cautious invasion”. Guardian, 12-06-1999. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/jun/12/balkans8, 27-10-2010.
 Anderson, Michael. “Russia and the Former Yugoslavia”. In Webber, Mark (Ed.). Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation? Houndmills : Macmillian Press; New York : St. Martin’s Press, 2000, pp. 203.
 Headley, James. “Russia and the Balkans: foreign policy from Yeltsin to Putin”. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2008, pp. 408.
 Cros, Sharyl. “Russia and NATO Toward the 21st Century: Conflicts and Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo”. NATO/Academic Affairs, 1999-2001. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/cross.pdf, 23-02-2011. pp. 17/18, and: Anderson, Michael. 2000, pp. 204.
 Headley, James. 2008, pp. 415.
 Simić, Predrag. ”Russia and the Kosovo and Metohija Problem”, In Korinman, Michael and Laughland, John (Eds.). Russia: A new cold war? London, Portland: Valentin Mitchell Academic, 2008, pp. 298
 Lukin, Alexander. “NATO and Russia after Kosovo crisis”. International Problems, Vol LI, No 3-4, 1999, pp. 301
 Lynch, Dov. “Russia faces Europe”. Paris, European Union: Institute for Security Studies, 2003,, pp. 10.
 Simić, Predrag, 2008, pp. 295.
 Ibid., pp. 294-296.
 Jamie Shea was a NATO spokesman during NATO intervention in Yugoslavia.
 Anonenko, Oksana. “Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo”. Survival, Vol. 41, No 4, 1999 , pp. 132. and: Marcus, Jonathan. “Russia compares Chechnya with Kosovo”. BBC News, 29-09-1999. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/460757.stm, 12-12-2010.
 Simić, Predrag. 2008, pp. 296 /297.
 Lynch, Dov. 2003, pp. 26.
 Arbatov, Alexei G.”The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya”. The Marshall Center Papers, No. 2, 2000, pp. 21
 Antonenko, Oksana. 1999, pp. 136 – 137
 Headley, James. 2008, pp. 424.
 Ibid., pp. 137.
 President of Russia, Press Statement and Responses to Questions from Journalists following Talks with Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. Sotschi. 3.6.2004. Taken from Reljić, Dušan.“Rusija i Zapadni Balkan“. Belgrade: ISAC fond, 2009, pp. 10
 A Speech made by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in Area of Deployment of Russian Military Contingent of International Peacekeeping Force in Kosovo, Pristina, June 17, 2001.
 Kordić, Marija.“Povlačenje priznanje poraza od NATO“. Nedeljni Telgraf, 25-06-2003, pp. 18/19
 B92.net.”Ivanov: Rusija nije izgubila interes za Balkan”. 04-06-2003. http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=06&dd=04&nav_category=11&nav_id=110328, 12-01-2011.
 Stošić, Branko. “Srbija i Crna Gora – Rusija:Nema više zabluda”. NIN (2730), 24-04-03,pp. 51.
 More about causes and consequences of Russian troops withdrawal in: Независимая газетa. “Уход с Балкан как неизбежность”. 31-07-2003, http://www.ng.ru/world/2003-07-31/6_balkany.html, 23-12-2009.
 About changes in Russian foreign policy after 9/11 read more in Tsygankov, Andrei P. “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and continuity in national identity”. Lahman: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. pp. 137 – 145 and Rogov, Sergei. “A New Turn in Russian – American Relations”. In Melville, Andrei and Shakleina, Tatiana (Eds.). Russian foreign policy in transition: concepts and realities, Budapest /New York: Central European University press, 2005 pp. 349 – 373.
Russia offered air corridors, shared intelligence with the United States, coordinated its activities with the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union and provided tens of millions of dollars in military equipment and weapons to the Northern Alliance. Look in: Lynch, Dov. pp. 9.
 Donaldson, Robert H. and Nogee, Joseph L. “The foreign policy of Russia: changing systems, enduring interests”. Armonk/ N.Y./London: Sharpe, 2009, 4. ed. pp. 350.
 For Kremlin this was an alarming situation because under the terms of 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), national ballistic systems are prohibited. Withdrawal of USA from ABM was a signal that USA had no obstacles to construct such a system, a system that could effectively annul the only remained tool in which Russia could parry USA – nuclear armament.
 Donaldson, Robert H. and Nogee, Joseph. 2009, pp. 357
 “No end to blockade of Russian troops in Orahovac”. Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 5, Issue. 157, 27-08-1999, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=11998&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=213 , 21-09-2010, and: Lazanski, Miroslav. “Sad su Rusi Krivi” Politika, 02-10-2010. http://www.politika.rs/pogledi/Miroslav-Lazanski/Sad-su-Rusi-krivi.lt.html, 09-01-2011.
 Simić, Predrag. 2008, pp. 299.
 SEE Security Monitor. “Putin meets Serbian PM, express readiness for involvement in Kosovo”. 03-06-2004. http://www.csees.net/?page=news&news_id=33724&country_id=8, 13-12-2010.
 Stošić, Branko. 24-04-2003, pp. 50.
 Reljić, Dušan. pp. 10
 Berryman, John. “Russia, NATO Enlargement, and “Regions of Privileged Interests”. In Kanet, Roger E. (Ed.). Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 231
 Headley, James. “Russia and the Balkans: foreign policy from Yeltsin to Putin”. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2008, pp. 440.
 B92.net. “Ivanov u Beogradu”. 11-09-2003. http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=09&dd=11&nav_category=11&nav_id=119243, 22-10-2010.
 SEE: Security Monitor. “Serbia’s Kostunica, Russian foreign ministers discuss bilateral ties, Kosovo”. 11-09-2004. http://www.csees.net/?page=news&news_id=22476&country_id=8, 23-12-2010.
Documents and speeches:
A Speech Made by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in Area of Deployment of Russian Military Contingent of International Peacekeeping Force in Kosovo, Pristina, June 17, 2001. Available at http://missions.itu.int/~russia/Bull/2001/25-2106B.htm, 14-11-2010.
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.rs/Foreinframe1.htm, 23-10-2009.
UN Security Council, 1244 Resolution, S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. Available at http://www.unmikonline.org/misc/N9917289.pdf, 12-08-2009.
Books and articles:
Anderson, Michael. “Russia and the Former Yugoslavia”. In Webber, Mark (Ed.). “Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation?” Houndmills: Macmillian Press; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.
Antonenko, Oksana. “Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo”. Survival, Vol. 41, No 4, 1999, pp. 124-144.
Arbatov, Alexei G. “The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya”. The Marshall Center Papers, No. 2, 2000, pp. 1-48
Berryman, John. “Russia, NATO Enlargement, and “Regions of Privileged Interests”. In Kanet, Roger E. (Ed.). “Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century”. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011
Cros, Sharyl. “Russia and NATO Toward the 21st Century: Conflicts and Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo”. NATO/Academic Affairs, 1999-2001. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/cross.pdf, 23-02-2011
Donaldson, Robert H. and Nogee, Joseph L. “The foreign policy of Russia: changing systems, enduring interests”. Armonk/N.Y./London: Sharpe, 2009, 4th edition.
Headley, James. “Russia and the Balkans: foreign policy from Yeltsin to Putin”. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2008.
Lukin, Alexander. “NATO and Russia after Kosovo crisis”. International Problems, Vol. LI, No 3-4, 1999, pp. 295-307.
Lynch, Dov. “Russia faces Europe”. Paris, European Union: Institute for Security Studies, 2003.
Reljić, Dušan. “Rusija i Zapadni Balkan”. Belgrade: ISAC fond, 2009.
Simić, Predrag. ”Russia and the Kosovo and Metohija Problem”. In Korinman, Michael and Laughland, John (Eds.). “Russia: A new cold war?”. London, Portland: Valentin Mitchell Academic, 2008.
On line resources and newspapers:
B92.net. “Ivanov u Beogradu”. 11-09-2003. http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=09&dd=11&nav_category=11&nav_id=119243, 22-10-2010.
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